

# FOREIGN POLICY BULLETIN

*An analysis of current international events*



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## ***Middle Course Emerging from Foreign Policy Debate***

The current historic nation-wide debate about the policy the United States should follow in world affairs promises to result in the adoption of a middle course between the Truman Doctrine and the Hoover Doctrine. An Associated Press survey of public opinion as reflected in letters to editors of American newspapers, published on December 30, indicated that the American people are sharply divided "on the course the United States should take to meet Communist aggression." However, the survey on the whole found a trend toward a middle-of-the-road view, "recognizing world obligations but without the United States 'biting off more than it can chew.'"

Such a middle course was traced by John Foster Dulles, Republican adviser to the Department of State, in his address of December 29 to the American Association for the United Nations in New York when he said that the "deterrent of retaliatory power" would make unnecessary any choice by this country between two "disastrous" alternatives. The United States, he declared, would not have to dissipate its strength in "futile attempts at 'static defense' all round the world. Neither would we have to 'crawl back into our own hole in a vain hope of defending ourselves against all the rest of the world,'" he added.

The Korean setback, which caused many Americans to feel that the United States, under the Truman Doctrine of undertaking to check Russia and communism, had overextended itself to a dangerous degree, brought about a reaction reflected in the December 20 radio address of Herbert

Hoover. This address, condemned as "isolationist" by Administration spokesmen, provoked widespread expressions of support, notably in the Middle West and the Southwest, with the Northeast and the Middle Atlantic States largely favoring continuance of the "containment" policy and the South and the Pacific Coast split on the subject.

### ***The Hoover Doctrine***

Mr. Hoover's thesis cannot be fairly described as a plea for return to the isolationism of the interwar years. What he proposes is that the United States adjust its policy to its available economic and military resources and stop taking on commitments which it is not presently equipped to implement. It is this feature of the Hoover program which makes a strong appeal to large, although not accurately ascertainable, numbers of the American people who have had an uneasy feeling for a long time that the material and manpower resources of this country were being spread too thinly along the far-flung periphery of the U.S.S.R. and that there was a growing danger the United States might become involved in a large-scale war on distant battlefronts, notably in China.

"We must face the fact," said Mr. Hoover, "that to commit the sparse ground forces of the non-Communist nations into a land war against this Communist land mass would be a war without victory, a war without a successful political terminal. Any attempt to make war on the Communist mass by land invasion, through

the quicksands of China, India or Western Europe is sheer folly."

While Mr. Hoover's first point in a program of action—the preservation of the United States as "this Western Hemisphere Gibraltar of Western civilization"—sounded like old-fashioned isolationism, he went on to urge that this country, "with our own air and naval forces," should hold the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans "with one frontier on Britain (if she wishes to cooperate); the other, on Japan, Formosa and the Philippines." He also expressed the hope that "a maximum of cooperation can be established between the British Commonwealth and ourselves"—although by referring earlier to the Commonwealth "of 150,000,000 people" he presumably was excluding its new Asian members—India, Pakistan and Ceylon.

If Mr. Hoover's blueprint were adopted, the United States would withdraw from Asia, except for such humanitarian aid as it might give the peoples of that continent, rearm Japan, irrevocably oppose the recognition of the Peiping regime and its admission to the United Nations and refuse to "land another man or another dollar" on the shores of Western European nations until they have "organized and equipped combat divisions of such huge numbers as would erect a sure dam against the red flood." The principal respect in which his specifications differ from those of the Administration as so far revealed concerns American aid to Western Europe. The Administration, since the dark days of the Chinese attack in Korea, has indicated that it is not planning further ground-force involvement on the Asian

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mainland, wants to sign a separate peace treaty with Japan providing for rearmament of the ex-enemy country and has no intention of recognizing Peiping or supporting its admission to the UN.

### ***Where Administration Differs***

It is on the issue of military and economic aid to Western Europe that Secretary of State Dean Acheson, fresh from North Atlantic pact negotiations at Brussels, has challenged Mr. Hoover. Mr. Acheson, in his year-end review of December 30, said: "This country must remain true to its tradition of standing by its friends. To abandon our allies would gratify the Kremlin. To do so would be appeasement on a gigantic scale. The Soviet Union, holding in unhappy bondage the peoples of Eastern Europe, wields enough power without making the Soviet imperialists a gift of the productive capacity and technical skills of Western Europe, plus the strategic resources and manpower of the Middle East and Africa."

A similar point of view was expressed by Mr. Dulles in his December 29 speech when he declared: "Any nation which at a moment of extreme danger sheds those of its allies which are most endangered, and to whom it is bound by solemn treaty . . . elects a dangerous course, for solitary defense is never impregnable. . . . A United States which could be an inactive spectator while the barbarians overrun and desecrated the cradle of our Christian civilization would not be the kind of United States which could defend itself." That the debate cuts sharply across partisan lines was indicated when Governor Thomas E. Dewey, in his third-term inaugural address on January 1, said: "We shall make united and mighty the forces of the free world, and swiftly, or we shall soon be isolated and left to die."

Neither Mr. Acheson nor Mr. Dulles, however, has proposed that the United States adopt the policy advocated by some Republican leaders who would not merely continue a holding operation in Korea but also demand that the Chinese Nationalists be given military and other assistance to renew active war against the Peiping regime. Thus by implication, although not yet explicitly, the Administration and those Republicans who support its foreign policy have indicated willingness to curtail the Truman Doctrine, at least so far as it involves ground-force opposition to Russia and communism in Asia, while concentrating American military and economic resources on efforts to create "a situation

of strength" in Western Europe. If such curtailment becomes a fixed part of current policy, then it could be argued that the United States has decided to pare down its overextended positions and to bring its commitments more closely into line with available means in terms of men and war material. Should further pressure by the Chinese Communists force complete withdrawal of the United Nations forces from Korea, the defense line in Asia suggested by Mr. Hoover—Japan, Formosa and the Philippines—would in fact have to be adopted.

### ***Is Europe Doing Its Bit?***

Thus, while the Truman Doctrine, setting forth the policy of containing Russia and communism wherever they threaten, appears to be in the process of being quietly whittled down in Asia, the Hoover Doctrine of abandoning Western Europe unless it can promptly organize its own defenses against Russian attack (in which case it presumably would no longer be in need of men or dollars from the United States) has not yet won overwhelming support in this country. There is, however, a growing tendency, even on the part of well-informed newspapers like *The New York Times*, to support Mr. Hoover's Western European thesis indirectly by repeated statements to the effect that the nations of Europe are "dragging their feet" and failing to provide adequate assistance in Korea as well as in their own theater of possible war.

Such comments overlook a number of facts. In Asia the French today have 150,000 troops, or close to the total of American forces in Korea, engaged in a prolonged guerrilla war against the forces of Communist leader Ho Chi Minh, while the British have 40,000 troops in Malaya—now particularly important as a source of tin and rubber—and in the Crown Colony of Hongkong. The French and British argue, with justification, that these troops are just as much involved in the struggle against Russia and communism as the American forces in Korea. Should they be withdrawn in order to lend us assistance on the Korean battlefield, they would either have to be replaced by comparable manpower or else the risk would have to be taken that Communist groups would assume control of Indo-China and Malaya. The alternatives would be for the West to pull militarily out of the Asian mainland, as Mr. Hoover suggests, or to try to split off Russia from Asian communism by dealing with Communist

regimes. This latter course neither Mr. Hoover nor Mr. Truman has proposed.

In Western Europe, as has often been pointed out in the *FOREIGN POLICY BULLETIN*, the nations which resisted Hitler for six years have found it difficult to carry out at one and the same time rearmament and economic recovery. If they were now asked to divert their still meager reserves of men and arms to Korea, this would denude the European front at a moment when Washington fears renewed pressure by the U.S.S.R. and would merely entail the dispatch of comparable American forces. Nothing can be gained, and much in the way of good psychological relations with Europe can be lost, by blaming our North Atlantic partners for the obvious fact, which we too must face squarely, that the West lacks now and for the immediate future ground forces sufficient to match those of Russia, let alone Russia and China combined.

In charting a middle course between the Truman Doctrine and the Hoover Doctrine, between a policy of unlimited commitments and a policy of strictly limited commitments, those who are charged with the making of foreign policy will need and should welcome the constructive criticism and the proposals for action of all citizens—should welcome, above all, the fact that the current debate has aroused the interest of so many people who had hitherto found no urge to express their views. It is, in turn, not only the privilege but the duty of every citizen to present his or her opinion on the role of the United States in world affairs—through letters to the newspapers, resolutions adopted in civic and professional organizations and direct communications to Congressmen and to the Department of State. There is every assurance that such communications are read and carefully studied in Washington for indications of the trend of public opinion.

VERA MICHELES DEAN

### ***Keep Cool With the FPA***

In this period of extreme tension, when official pronouncements and public opinion oscillate sharply from extreme optimism to extreme pessimism, let the *Foreign Policy Reports* help you maintain a sense of perspective on fast-moving events.  
**READ:**

MILITARY AND ECONOMIC STRENGTH OF WESTERN EUROPE—October 15, 1950.

MILITARY POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES—December 15, 1950.

FAR EASTERN POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES—March 1, 1951.

# German Arms Issue Jeopardizes Western Unity

The German problem is the most difficult one the United States must face in Europe in its attempt to increase the strength of the non-Soviet world. Yet the two apparent alternatives—1) rearming the West Germans as an integral component of European defense, or 2) negotiating a treaty with the Russians for the unification of a demilitarized Germany—cannot be equated with the broad alternatives implied by the Truman Doctrine and the Hoover Doctrine respectively, as close examination reveals.

At the Brussels meeting of the Atlantic pact foreign and defense ministers, previous agreements on the general principle of using German forces in a European army were endorsed but decisions on specific details were postponed because of unexpectedly strong opposition within Germany and because of European reactions to Russian pressure.

Strong Soviet opposition to German rearmament, coupled with a proposal from Moscow for new four-power discussions on Germany—repeated in the Soviet note of December 30—raised doubts about the whole project. Many Europeans hoped for a diplomatic solution and, even should that hope prove illusory, thought it unwise to proceed with actual arms until every alternative had been explored. The United States agreed to go along with the French and British desire for new great-power talks but insisted that they should cover the Far East and Austria as well as the German question.

On December 22 the Allied High Commission accepted Adenauer's demand that discussions begin on the terms of a "contractual basis" for the relations between West Germany and the North Atlantic countries to replace the Occupation Statute. In exchange, the Germans agreed that a military committee would examine the "scale and manner" of Bonn's military contribution to European defense.

The outcome and significance of these discussions will be determined by the extent to which they can overcome three major hazards.

## German Reluctance

The first hazard is German opposition to rearmament on the terms offered. This opposition stems from various motives, including the war-weariness, bitterness and apathy of many Germans numbed by years of totalitarianism, war and the struggle

for survival; the fear that rearmament may reinstate reactionary and hypernationalistic groups through reviving the power of former Nazi officers and Ruhr industrialists; unwillingness to see Western Germany made the battleground for a fratricidal struggle with the East Germans in which foreign powers would be the main beneficiaries; and reluctance to support sacrifices that hold out little promise of German unification, national equality with other allies, or even of military security if rearmament should provide the *casus belli* for a Russian attack.

The most significant organized expressions of this antirearmament sentiment have come from Dr. Kurt Schumacher's powerful opposition Social Democratic party, which has made significant gains in recent elections. Schumacher, while fearing the domestic consequences of rearmament, has insisted on West Germany's equality of status and a guarantee that America would share fully in defense risks by an immediate build-up of its divisions on the Elbe. Important Protestant leaders—notably Rev. Martin Niemöller, a man who defied Hitler—now also denounce rearmament for a combination of religious and nationalistic reasons.

German antipathy toward rearmament has been heightened by deliberate Communist policy. The Prague proposals on German unification of October 20 and overtures to Bonn subsequently made by the East German regime have raised hopes in Germany for a diplomatic settlement. At the same time the Communists have launched an intensive blackmail and intimidation campaign based on the East German announcement that anyone who advocates rearmament will be executed as a war criminal.

Should German opposition continue, it is clear that a German army—lacking popular support and high morale among its troops and officers—would be of little value to the West. Any attempt to enlist volunteers in the face of popular antipathy might result in the arming of mercenaries, adventurers and neo-Nazis, certainly no asset for the democratic cause.

A second major hazard created by the decision to rearm Germans is the possibility that the Russians would respond by direct military intervention, as intimated by the Soviet notes of October 18 and December 16.

If one assumes that the Soviet Union is following an aggressive strategy, it would follow that the Russians must seek control of the Ruhr's industry to augment the productive capacity of the Soviet bloc. Consequently Moscow could not tolerate the construction of a military force in Western Europe strong enough to safeguard the Ruhr for a long time. It would feel obliged to strike quickly.

## Russian Reaction

If the Russians are following a defensive policy, however, the same conclusion follows. According to Communist doctrines, the capitalist world is attempting to encircle and destroy the Soviet regime. The belief that the United States intends to develop and control Ruhr industry as a major spearhead for the Western offensive is a basic corollary of this doctrine. Consequently the Russians would think that they had no alternative but to attack militarily if diplomatic and political weapons failed to neutralize German industry.

To carry out such an operation, however, Moscow need be in no hurry. The Russians are said to have about 30 divisions in East Germany, plus the East German so-called people's police of 50,000 to 75,000 militarily equipped and trained men. The West Germans might be able to recruit 300,000 officers and men by 1955, according to a study by some German military and business leaders reported on December 30. The Western allies have the equivalent of eight divisions in Germany already and could add to this number in due course. The Russians, however, could more than match such a build-up by drawing on 60 divisions in Eastern Europe and perhaps 150 divisions at home. Thus Moscow could wait at least a year, if not longer, without losing its overwhelming land superiority and could therefore choose a time it regards as most convenient for an attack.

Should the West, to speed up creation of a German force, fully exonerate former officers and soldiers of the Third Reich, hoping to use their experience and knowledge in the new army, fears of a Nazi revival in Germany would be intensified. If, however, a decision were taken to recruit an anti-Fascist army based on rigid enlistment requirements, it would be necessary to start from scratch. The most trustworthy type of German forces could



be created only after considerable preparation.

A third major danger is the likelihood that any decision to rearm Germans, no matter how qualified, will seriously weaken French solidarity, creating the possibility of a collapse similar to that of 1940 in the face of a real emergency.

In the light of these factors, it is easy to understand why many West Europeans strongly oppose the American-led effort to rearm any Germans. They consider that whatever direct military gains might be made would be more than offset by the

increased incentive for a quick Russian attack and the deterioration of Western European morale, both inside and outside of Germany. It is to be feared, moreover, that the safeguards envisioned by present plans for integrating German forces in a European army would not effectively overcome these hazards. In any event, if the Germans themselves refuse to cooperate, the plans could not be put into effect. No irrevocable decision on the German question, therefore, seems advisable until other alternatives have first been thoroughly explored.

FRED W. RIGGS

(The first article of a series on Western defense.)

## News in the Making

**FRENCH FEARS SPUR DEFENSE:** Premier René Plevin, in a New Year's message, warned the French people that the Viet-minh rebels in Indo-China led by Moscow-trained Ho Chi Minh appeared ready to involve their nation in the "horrors of war"—despite the fact that Paris has granted independence to the Associated States of Indo-China within the French Union. World tensions—in Indo-China, elsewhere in Asia and in Europe—account for the adoption by the French National Assembly of Plevin's program of increased tax rates and a record \$2,114 million arms budget. The new defense budget was assured of full adoption after the Premier had won four confidence votes in the Assembly.

**BRITISH COMMONWEALTH DEFENSE:** Prime ministers of the Commonwealth nations opened a conference in London on January 4 which is expected to canvass the views of the member governments on their defense problems. Varying policies toward Communist China will be under discussion. British Prime Minister Clement Attlee, following his recent visit with President Truman, is prepared to give a full report on the American attitude. The possibility of a Pacific defense pact may also be reviewed.

**WHEAT FOR INDIA:** A new group—the American Emergency Food Committee for India—has been formed with headquarters in New York to press for American aid to relieve near-famine conditions in India. India made a formal request to the State Department on December 16 for 2 million tons of grain.

**REARMAMENT FOR JAPAN:** Amidst discussions of a possible basis for a peace treaty with Japan, the Liberal party administration of Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida has been hitherto understood to favor rearmament under American protection. On December 29, however, Yoshida announced that he did not consider rearmament necessary, and on New Year's Day his secretary-general explained that although the government would take measures to protect Japan, this did not necessarily mean rearming.

## FPA Bookshelf

BOOKS ON THE UNITED STATES IN WORLD AFFAIRS

*The Strengthening of American Political Institutions.* Ithaca, N. Y., Cornell University Press, 1949. \$2.

A collection of essays on various topics—legislative reorganization, industrial mobilization, the loyalty program, presidential powers—by A. S. Mike Monroney, Thomas J. Hargrave, Thurman Arnold, Arthur E. Sutherland, Jr., and Don K. Price. The final chapter on the formulation of American foreign policy by Edgar Ansel Mowrer offers particularly timely advice.

*America's Colonial Experiment*, by Julius W. Pratt. New York, Prentice-Hall, 1950. \$6.

At a time when the problems of colonial and ex-colonial peoples bulk large in the public's attention, it is pertinent to review the record of our own dealings with dependent areas. The Professor of American History at the University of Buffalo, has produced a convenient analysis of the forces which pushed the United States into colonialism, the policies followed in governing our territories, and the reasons for the "Retreat from Empire" manifested in relinquishment of control over the Philippines.

*Documents on American Foreign Relations, Vol. XI, 1949*, edited by Raymond Dennett and Robert K. Turner. Princeton, Princeton University Press, published for the World Peace Foundation, 1950. \$6.

The latest volume in this basic series provides source materials dealing with such developments as the inauguration of Point Four, reorganization of the State Department, establishment of a government in West Germany, triumph of the Communists in China, the North Atlantic treaty and the Military Assistance Program.

*The United States in World Affairs, 1949*, by Richard P. Stebbins and the Research Staff of the Council on Foreign Relations. New York, Harper, 1950. \$5.

A comprehensive review of the year's international developments seen in historic perspective, against a background of the East-West struggle as both sides attempted to consolidate and strengthen their respective spheres. Supplemented with a useful bibliography and chronology.

*The United States as a World Power. A Diplomatic History 1900-1950*, by Samuel Flagg Bemis. New York, Holt, 1950. \$5.

The third part of his *Diplomatic History of the United States*, revised and brought up to date, by the Sterling Professor of Diplomatic History at Yale University. A scholarly survey for the serious student of world affairs.

*How Foreign Policy Is Made*, by Kurt London. New York, Van Nostrand, 1949. \$3.50.

An analysis of the elements, formulation and execution of foreign policy, illustrated by a discussion of British, French, Nazi German, and Soviet experience, with special emphasis on the record and problems of the United States in dealing with power struggles and ideological clashes in the atomic age. The author has traveled and studied widely and has worked for the State Department as well as for other United States government agencies.

*American Immigration Policy, A Reappraisal*, edited by William S. Bernard, Carolyn Zeleny, Henry Miller. New York, Harper, 1950. \$4.

The results of a study, conducted by the National Committee on Immigration Policy, this volume presents an analysis of the role of immigration in American history, stressing its economic and sociological effects at home and its international repercussions. The authors make a plea for liberalizing the present immigration laws and remedying some of their defects.

### Branch and Affiliate Meetings

BETHLEHEM, January 8, *Does Korea Demonstrate the Need for a UN Army?*, Bill Costello

LYNN, January 8, *Asiatic Imperialisms—New and Old*, Judokus Van DenNoort

POUGHKEEPSIE, January 8, *Can the West Unite?*, Arthur B. Schlesinger, Jr.

DETROIT, January 11, *Germany and Western Europe*, Preston Slosson

PITTSBURGH, January 11, *Report on Europe and Asia*, Paul R. Anderson, William Block

DETROIT, January 16, *Frontiers of U.S. Foreign Policy*, Brooks Emeny

PROVIDENCE, January 16, Special Meeting for Fund Raising, "Who Said That?"

CINCINNATI, January 17, *General World Situation*, Paul Henri Spaak

NEW YORK, January 18, *France and Today's Crisis*, Georges-Henri Martin

PHILADELPHIA, January 20, Career Conference for High School Students

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